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Emancipating Agents: Need Schrödinger’s Cat
be let into the Chinese Room?
INTRODUCTION
In reflecting on the human condition, one has to face the Anthropocentric Question: Are humans
really special? Most of us would like to believe the affirmative, and look to science for support.
Carl Linnaeus classified humans with monkeys and apes in 1758, and humans have felt insulted
ever since. For two centuries we managed to console ourselves with the thought that human
language, intellectual capacity, and culture made us more special than Linnaeus’s classification
acknowledged. In recent years, however, the rise of cognitive science as a laboratory for testing
philosophical ideas has furnished new perspectives on the human condition by situating us
within a spectrum of various sorts of agents, and the insights to which this has led do not
confirm what we wish were true. Recent work on bonobos1  and chimpanzees2  has largely
undermined the consolatory belief in an unbridgeable abyss between humans and other animals,
despite resistance3 .
If apes resemble us too closely for comfort, can we seek solace in an unbridgeable gulf between
humans and artificial agents? Or is it conceivable that artificial agents might be designed to
cope intelligently with their environments in ways that resemble human strategies for living, for
example by solving problems creatively, using language, and belonging to co-operative
communities that collectively endorse principles of justice and compassion?
In considering this question we shall briefly recapitulate the argument which relies on Gödel’s
Incompleteness Theorem to substantiate the existence of such an unbridgeable divide. An
excursion into research on cognition will lead us to the conclusion that the features of human
cognition that are relevant to the main argument are in principle available to embodied artificial
agents. Gödel’s theorem may then be re-interpreted as demarcating a boundary between
disembodied cold cognition and embodied hot cognition, and the gap between embodied
artificial agents and humans perceived as a ditch rather than an abyss.
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THE CHINESE ROOM THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
The simplest artificial agents are computer programs, like word-processors. You provide input
to the program through the keyboard, the program does things to the input, and finally output is
delivered to the screen. It is perfectly reasonable to think of the program as an agent. And
although it is clearly not a very versatile agent, since it cannot pour you a glass of wine to ease
the throes of composition, it may often be intelligently helpful, for instance when it corrects your
spelling or grammar.
John Searle4  devised a famous thought experiment to show the magnitude of the difference
between such a program and a human being. Imagine a man who does not know any Chinese
at all, closed up in a room with, say, a fax machine through which messages can be received and
sent. Suppose that enquiries are faxed to the man in Chinese. Although the man is ignorant of
Chinese, imagine that there are rules posted up on the walls (the program) which the man can
use to decide what mysterious symbols to send in response to the inputs. Is it possible, Searle
asks, for it to appear to outside observers as if the man in the room understands Chinese? The
man is like a computer program, following rules without understanding them, and the
appearance of intelligence is mere appearance lacking in substance.
When we reflect on what a word-processor and Searle’s man in the Chinese room have in
common, we realise that they share three points of similarity:
• Their only ‘sensor’ is a communication channel that receives symbols as input.
• They manipulate symbols syntactically – that is, they manipulate symbols by following
rules based on the shapes of the symbols, without understanding what the symbols
mean.
• Their input is under the control of other agents, so that in effect they are being used as
slaves – they lack autonomy.
Let us call such agents instrumental.
The most widely known articulation of the claim that humans are separated from artificial
agents by an unbridgeable abyss, due to Roger Penrose5 , takes Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem
as establishing limitations of instrumental agents to which humans are not subject. By definition,
instrumental agents are limited to computation, since this is just another name for rule-based
symbol-manipulation. Human understanding surpasseth computation, by Gödel’s theorem. So
if we assume that artificial agents are condemned to be instrumental, the conclusion follows.
THE PENROSE ARGUMENT
Consider an instrumental agent like a word-processor or the man in the Chinese room, obliged
to process meaningless symbols according to rules based on their shapes. Surprisingly, an
agent of this limited sort is able, if the rules are appropriately chosen, to prove theorems of
mathematics6  expressed in the symbols of a formal language. Some impressively difficult and
important results in mathematics have been accomplished by such theorem-provers. In 1931,
however, Kurt Gödel7  showed that there exists a sentence G, true of the natural numbers, that
cannot be proved by any theorem-prover given as input only a formal description of the properties
of the natural numbers (unless the agent also ‘proves’ a lot of things that aren’t true).
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The existence of this true-but-unprovable sentence G is Roger Penrose’s justification for asserting
that the human brain has capabilities that cannot be duplicated by artificial agents such as
theorem-proving computer programs. Truth, it is claimed, is a matter of human intuition
(“understanding”), a faculty that according to Penrose is so mysterious only (a new form of)
quantum mechanics can account for it.
What Penrose seeks from quantum mechanics is nondeterminism at the level of neural synapses.
Nondeterminism arises in quantum mechanics because a system can be in a superposition of
states, from which the act of measurement wrenches the system unpredictably into one or
another particular state. For example8 , imagine that a box is prepared for occupancy by an
unfortunate cat (a scenario devised by Erwin Schrödinger, an influential figure in early quantum
theory). A radioactive substance like uranium is placed inside the box, together with a detector.
A time period is chosen such that there is a 50-50 chance of one of the uranium nuclei decaying
within that period, and the detector is set to activate a switch that will release a deadly poison,
if such decay occurs. Now the cat is placed in the box and the lid is shut. As the time passes, the
system – consisting of the randomly decaying substance, the poison, and the cat, all enclosed
in the box – is in a superposition of two states. The cat is simultaneously both dead and alive,
and it is only when the lid is opened at the end of the time period, so that a human observer can
see what’s going on, that the system leaps into one of the two particular states. Only in that
instant will the cat instantaneously become either alive or dead, and it is impossible to predict
which.
It is such superposition and the consequent nondeterminism that Penrose hopes may explain
the power of human intuition to go where no step-by-step theorem-prover dare tread. To evaluate
the merits of this claim, we should first improve our grasp on the concept of intuition, which may
not be as mysterious as Penrose believes.
What can cognitive science tell us about human intuition? Following Zajonc’s 1980 paper9  a
flood of evidence10  has demonstrated that humans have two information processing systems
that work in parallel and that underpin two kinds of cognition, namely reasoning (or cold cognition)
and intuition (or hot cognition).
The following table summarises the differences between the two systems.
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Reasoning = cold cognition
Under conscious control




Unique to humans over age 2 and
language-trained apes
Disembodied and platform-independent




Intuition = hot cognition
Automatic
One-step process in the sense that result
suddenly appears in consciousness
Involves analogical pattern-matching
Does not demand attentional resources
Common to all mammals
Embodied and platform-dependent





Penrose’s argument rests upon three claims: that Gödel’s theorem places limits on reasoning
that do not hold for intuition, that intuition is in principle beyond the capabilities of artificial
agents, and that quantum mechanics must be invoked in order to account for the human ability
to employ intuition.
The first thing that strikes one upon examining the formulation and proof of Gödel’s theorem is
that it does not appear to be about intuition in any obvious sense, for the demonstration that
the sentence G is true is itself made by a step-by-step argument, in other words via reasoning.
The demonstration that G is true of the natural numbers occurs at the meta-level (in this case,
the level of set theory), using a more expressive language than that available to the instrumental
agent which was attempting to prove theorems about the natural numbers. If we call the
symbol-strings manipulated by the agent the object-language, then the meta-language is a
language in which we are able to quote all the symbol-strings of the object-language and say
things about them that couldn’t be said in the object-language itself. Set theory is a more
powerful theory than number theory, and a proof that sentence G is true of the natural numbers
can be given in set theory, although as Gödel showed no such proof could be given in number
theory itself. In a sense, therefore, Gödel’s theorem is merely a comparative statement about
the relative expressiveness of two language-levels.
However, there is another sense in which Gödel’s theorem is indeed about intuition, and this
connection depends on the notion of representation.
SEMANTICS
An agent encountering a sensory input (via sensors that resemble human senses such as vision
or hearing) forms an iconic representation of the stimulus object. By iconic we mean that the
representation is an analog of the sensory input (in other words bears a direct relationship – a
similarity – to the proximal projection of the distal stimulus object on the agent’s transducer
surfaces). By a process which is not yet fully understood, but which includes an analog-to-digital
conversion, representations which are symbolic may be formed. Symbolic representations involve
discrete symbols such as those of language, whose association with the signified object is
conventional rather than based on similarity. The name of the person whose face we recognise
is a symbolic representation of that person, whereas the image we form of the face is an iconic
representation.11
Reasoning involves symbolic representations (more precisely, the syntactic transformations
which change one symbolic representation into another). This syntactic computational process
is useful because the symbolic representations are not meaningless12 . The meaning of a symbolic
representation is provided by the iconic representations in which it is grounded, e.g. from which
it was manufactured. We say that these grounding iconic representations provide the semantics
of the symbolic representation. Instrumental agents such as word-processors, theorem-provers,
or the man in the Chinese room lack any semantics for the symbolic representations they
syntactically manipulate.
The significance of this limitation is that a mathematician demonstrating the Gödel sentence G
to be true of the natural numbers is obliged to have recourse to the semantics of G, for truth is
a semantic notion operationally defined in terms of denotation. To decide whether a sentence
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is true, you have to go and look whether what it says is so, really is so. As it happens, the
semantics of mathematical sentences (where sentence = symbolic representation) is abstract,
being provided by sets rather than distal stimulus objects living in the physical world. Thus to
establish the truth of sentence G, it is sufficient to invoke the language of set theory and to
describe how to build up the relevant sets. Consequently the truth of G could be established by
reasoning, albeit in a meta-language powerful enough to allow descriptions of the iconic
representations (e.g. the set of natural numbers) constituting the semantics of G. But this is
unusual. It works only because mathematical objects are abstract.
In the everyday physical world, as distinct from the abstract universe of mathematics, semantics
must be found outside language and through the senses. The iconic representations providing
the semantics are like pictures, and a picture is worth not a mere thousand words but an infinite
number of words. As Harnad13  puts it:
Words obviously fall short when they leave out some critical feature that would be
necessary to sort some future or potential anomalous instance; but even if one
supposes that every critical feature anyone would ever care to mention has been
mentioned, a description will always remain essentially incomplete in the following
ways:
(a) A description cannot convey the qualitative nature of the object being
described (i.e. it cannot yield knowledge by acquaintance), although it can
converge on it as closely as the describer’s descriptive resources and
resourcefulness allow. (Critical here will be the prior repertoire of direct
experiences and atomic labels on which the descriptions can draw.)
(b) There will always remain inherent features of the object that will require
further discourse to point out; an example would be a scene that one had
neglected to mention was composed of a prime number of distinct colours.
(c) In the same vein, there would be all the known and yet-to-be-discovered
properties of the prime numbers that one could speak of – all of them
entailed by the properties of the picture, all of them candidates (albeit far-
fetched ones) for further discourse “about” the picture.
(d) Finally, and most revealingly, there are the inexhaustible shortcomings of
words exemplified by all the iterative afterthoughts made possible by, say,
negation: for example, “the number of limbs is not two …” The truth of all
these potential descriptions is inherent in the picture, yet it is obvious that
no exhaustive description would be possible. Hence all descriptions will
only approximate a true, complete “description”.
Gödel’s theorem may now be seen as one instance14  of a general thesis: that truth, being a
semantic notion, ultimately requires the use of iconic representations which, outside of
mathematics, can only be approximated by descriptions in language. As the psychologist Lila
Gleitman avers, “linguistic systems are merely the formal expressive medium that speakers
devise to describe their mental representations”, and “linguistic categories and structures [serve
as] more-or-less straightforward mappings from a pre-existing conceptual space, programmed
into our biological nature.”15
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Instrumental agents lack the capacity to ground their symbols semantically since they lack the
sensory apparatus with which to gain iconic representations. They are therefore unable to deal
with the semantic notion of truth. Intuition is even further beyond them as it involves, not step-
by-step reasoning implemented as syntactic manipulation of symbols, but something more like
image processing applied to iconic representations. Would equipping an agent with sensors be
sufficient to provide it with intuition? To see that this is not the case we must look more closely
at the way intuition works, which turns out to involve the capacity to experience emotions.
INTUITION AND THE EMOTIONS
Reflect again on the table which summarises and contrasts the features of reasoning (cold
cognition) and intuition (hot cognition). The differences include conscious awareness, and this
gives us a way to measure the relative importance of the two forms of cognition. One of the
most profound insights to emerge from cognitive science in the past two decades is that most
of our everyday thinking and decision-making is performed at a level inaccessible to our conscious
awareness16 . So pervasive is automaticity (the ability of the hot cognitive system to solve
problems unconsciously) that perhaps we should pause to consider why its antithesis – reasoning
– evolved at all.
John Bargh17  and Bill Clancey18  suggest that the purpose of consciousness is to connect a
parallel mind to a serial world. One benefit of establishing such a connection is that
communication between agents can occur, communication being a sequential process.
Communication in turn offers the benefit that agents can learn from one another. Step-by-step
reasoning can be cast into the form of serial communication, and is therefore of importance for
explanation and social learning. It is also not unknown for an agent to change its mind about
something after articulating the evidence for and against, hence reasoning has a role to play as
a safety net that helps to catch errors that may be made by hot cognition.
We may conclude that conscious reasoning is a secondary mechanism which supplements hot
cognition in agents that have evolved or been designed to form symbolic representations. But
how does the primary system of unconscious hot cognition work?
Much of our understanding of hot cognition is due to Antonio Damasio19 . He studied patients
with damage to the ventromedial frontal lobe. Such patients have unimpaired intelligence, as
far as IQ tests can determine, but their ability to make sensible decisions is conspicuously
reduced. The only deficit exhibited by these patients, and therefore the likely cause of their poor
decision-making, is an emotional flatness, a reduced capacity for feeling emotion. Fascinating
experiments20  involving the Iowa Gambling Task shed more light on the relationship between
the emotional deficit and the impaired decision-making.
The subject has four decks of cards. Each card contains a reward, but some cards carry a
penalty. The subject has an initial stake of $2000. The turning of any card in decks A and B pays
a generous $100, while cards in decks C and D pay only $50. However, some cards in decks A
and B (the high-paying decks) require the player to make a sudden high payment to the
experimenter, sometimes as much as $1250, whereas the cards in decks C and D that carry a
penalty impose much smaller sums, typically less than $100. These facts are not disclosed to
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the subject, who has to learn by sampling. Normal subjects begin by sampling from all four
decks. Lured by the experience of high reward from turning over cards in the A and B decks, they
show an early preference for those decks. Gradually, within the first 30 turns, they switch their
preference to decks C and D and stick to this strategy to the end. Ventromedial patients, in
complete contrast, never change the early preference for the A and B decks. Despite the larger
amounts they receive from these cards, the penalties they keep having to pay are so high that
halfway through the game they are bankrupt. This is the case even for ventromedial patients
who describe themselves as conservative and prudent.
When the experiments were repeated with the subjects hooked up to a polygraph, the profile of
skin conductance responses revealed an astonishing pattern. Both normal subjects and
ventromedial patients showed skin conductance responses after turning over a card, but quite
soon the normal subjects also began to show a skin conductance response while they were
deliberating whether to pick a card from the ‘bad’ decks A and B. Thus the normal subjects were
learning to predict a bad outcome – and this occurred well before they were consciously aware
of and able to articulate the strategy of avoiding decks A and B. Ventromedial patients, on the
other hand, showed no anticipatory responses whatever! Simply put, the ventromedial patients
did not learn from their experiences even though, at the time of turning over a card, their
experience was emotionally valenced.
Damasio’s hypothesis is that the emotional deficit of ventromedial patients undermines their
ability to generate and effectively use somatic markers, neural representations of body states
that imbue behavioural options with affective significance and thus guide real-time decision-
making. The somatic markers form the basis of the unconscious, automatic, hot cognitive
system that we have called ‘intuition’. Somatic markers depend on emotions, though not on the
conscious awareness of an emotion. There is a difference, Damasio asserts, between an emotion
as reflected by changes in the body, on the one hand, and the feeling or conscious awareness of
that emotion on the other. To emote is to alter the state of the body – the viscera, the musculature,
the internal milieu. Consciousness has to do with continuous signals from the body to the brain
that provide an ongoing backdrop, and when these signals result in changes to the brain’s map
of the body, a conscious feeling is experienced. Indeed, signals from the prefrontal cortex or
amygdala can change the body map directly, providing a mechanism of as-if-body and
accommodating the roles of imagination and memory in generating feelings.
If intuition depends on somatic markers, which involve emotions, then it makes sense to look
more closely at the role of emotions in the decision-making of agents.
EMOTIONS AND EMANCIPATED AGENTS
From the perspective of cognitive science, a human agent may be viewed metaphorically as a
cage containing a crowd of inner subagents each of which is functionally specialised for solving
problems in a different domain: face recognition, mate choice, heart rate regulation, sleep
management, predator vigilance, and so on. The inner subagents are activated by cues from the
environment, but there is an organisational challenge to be overcome: some subagents should
not be activated together, while others should. For example, sleep and flight from a predator are
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mutually inconsistent, and it is no accident that sleep is impossible while your heart is racing
with fear. But predator avoidance is enhanced by simultaneous shifts in both heart rate and
auditory acuity. There is thus a need for superordinate inner agents that co-ordinate the
suppression or activation of subagents. The superordinate inner agents21  are emotions.
When a condition or situation having a recognisable cue is encountered, a signal is sent out
from the superordinate emotion-agent to activate the specific constellation of subagents
appropriate for solving the types of adaptive problems associated with that sort of situation.
This constellation of subagents is sometimes referred to as the agent’s momentary thought-
action repertoire. By way of example, consider being alone at night and hearing a sound that
indicates the possible presence of a predator. Your momentary thought-action repertoire is
affected in the following ways:
• Shifts in perception and attention: you suddenly hear with greater clarity sounds that
bear on the hypothesis that you are being stalked but that ordinarily you would not
perceive or attend to.
• Shifts in goals and motivational weightings: safety becomes a higher priority than hunger
or charming a potential mate.
• Shifts in information-gathering: watching the news becomes less important than checking
where the baby is or trying to see whether there is a prowler in the garden.
• Shifts in categorisation: the hallway closet becomes salient as an instance of the category
of hiding places rather than the category of storage spaces.
• Shifts in memory retrieval tasks: did the man in the grocery store give you a funny look
earlier that day?
• Shifts in communication processes: your face assumes a species-typical fear expression
and your voice becomes high-pitched.
• Physiological changes occur: gastric mucosa turn white as blood leaves the digestive
tract and heart rate goes up.
• Specialised learning systems are activated: if the threat is real and the ambush occurs,
you may experience an amygdala-mediated recalibration that, as in post-traumatic stress
disorder, may last for the rest of your life.
• Particular courses of action are potentiated: you resort to fight or to flight or to hiding or
even to tonic immobility (paralysis).
Recent work on the positive emotions22  suggests that the general difference between the
positive valence generated by cues from a preferred environment and the negative valence
generated by cues from an unsafe environment is that positive emotional states are characterised
by a broadened thought-action repertoire, facilitating exploration, learning and creativity23 ;
while negative affect is characterised by a narrowing of the repertoire to promote quick and
decisive action.
Long before this understanding of human emotion was attained, Herbert Simon24  suggested
that the behaviour of artificial agents might benefit from the influence of an emotional interrupt
system, capable of setting aside ongoing programs when real-time needs of high priority are
encountered. More recently research has been directed at enabling robots and user-interfaces
to recognise human emotions25 .
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Although the design of agents having a system of emotion-analogs acting as superordinate
inner agents for the co-ordination of specialised subagents is still in its infancy, this does not
mean that there is any barrier, either in principle or in practice, to producing simple versions of
such designs. It would be a simple matter indeed to equip, say, a robotic explorer with a system
of emotional valences based on its remaining fuel supply. While it has plenty of fuel, its affective
state is positive and its subprograms for exploration are active. When the fuel supply drops
below a critical threshold, its affective state becomes negative and its momentary thought-
action repertoire shrinks to focus on returning to the nearest source of fuel.
But can a sufficiently complex system of emotions be designed to provide a substrate for
autonomous decision-making in everyday contexts? How complex must a system of emotions
be in order for us to recognise a kinship with the artificial agents?
The emotional system must be at least sufficiently complex to afford the capacity for humanlike
intuition. Furthermore, we expect agents that are capable of adopting humanlike strategies for
coping with their environments both to act autonomously and to engage in collective effort.
Emotions are necessary to ensure that such behaviour is responsible and not psychopathic.
This becomes clear as soon as we note that some emotions serve a social function. Self-
conscious emotions like embarrassment, shame, guilt, and pride are associated with a process
of evaluating our own behaviour and holding ourselves responsible for the effects of our
actions26 . Such emotions regulate the behaviour of individuals in a community and help to
render trust and co-operation feasible by providing an internal constraint against cheating. The
absence of such emotions would undermine the usefulness of a community as a vehicle for
collective problem-solving by permitting system-cheats to flourish without constraint other than
external detection.
Psychopaths27  are the prototypical system-cheats, simulating normality but having no moral
compunction about using and abusing other agents to achieve their goals.
There are thought-provoking similarities between psychopaths and the ventromedial patients
studied by Damasio. Both categories fail to learn from experience. Both fail to show a skin
conductance response to pictures (e.g. of people dying) that arouse strong emotional responses
in normal subjects. The causes of their emotional shallowness are different, however, leading
to divergence in, for example, language use. Ventromedial patients have no characteristic
language deficit. Psychopaths appear to use language in a disjointed fashion – while they are
glib and superficially charming, able to speak fluently and to deploy a large vocabulary, to the
discerning ear it is apparent that stock phrases are used repeatedly and words and sentences
are often incompletely articulated and incoherently strung together28 . Psychopaths seem to
process language syntactically rather than semantically, at least in the sense that they apparently
don’t ‘get’ the emotional connotations of words. One is reminded of instrumental agents such
as word-processors. In a typical test, the subject watches different words come onto a monitor
screen. Some of the words are chosen to have emotional associations, others to be neutral.
Whereas normal people respond more quickly to emotional words, psychopaths have the same
response time to both emotional and neutral words. When whole brain functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) is used, it is found that normals who process negative emotional
words (e.g. rape, death, cancer) display increased activity in the limbic regions of the brain,
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whereas for psychopaths there was no increased activity in these regions29  but over-activation
in parts of the brain ordinarily devoted to language, as if emotional material were being analysed
in terms of its dictionary definition.
Let us take an emancipated agent to be one that is capable of using humanlike strategies for
living, such as co-operation with other agents. An emancipated agent cannot be a psychopath.
Co-operation with other members of a community is incompatible with being a system-cheat.
Psychopaths are system-cheats for a number of reasons. Not only are they relatively shielded
from the self-conscious emotions like shame but their emotional shallowness also blocks the
formation of moral sentiments. In normal human beings, beliefs can undergo a process of
change from being a matter of preference (“I don’t eat meat because I feel healthier without it”)
to being a matter of moral conviction (“I don’t eat meat because killing animals is wrong”)30 .
Moral convictions are entrenched – they change not in response to reasoned arguments but
only to align with the beliefs of other members of the community31 . The entrenched status of
moral convictions has evolutionary advantages for a community of co-operating agents, for the
permanence of such beliefs renders agents predictable and eliminates the concern that fellow
agents may be engaged in daily calculations of the profits or costs of actions. The entrenchment
appears to be accomplished by the recruitment of emotions such as disgust. Without a system
of emotions that is properly functioning and sufficiently broad to provide a means for the
formation of moral sentiments, autonomous artificial agents could not be trusted any more
than psychopaths can. If we are to avoid the pitfalls illustrated by such celluloid fantasies as
“The Matrix” and “I, Robot”, our artificial agents had better possess a full panoply of emotions.
CONCLUSION
Penrose is correct in construing Gödel’s theorem as distinguishing between the abilities of
instrumental agents, which are limited to cold cognition, and humans, who have intuition.
However, Penrose is mistaken in relying on this result to accord humans a special status, for
instrumental agents such as theorem-provers do not constitute the theoretical pinnacle of
achievement for designers of artificial agents.
Instrumental agents may be contrasted with emancipated agents – autonomous agents which
are embodied, affective, intuitive, and conscious of their feelings. Embodiment implies
possession of their own sensors/senses through which to gain iconic representations. Affect
implies possession of organisational ‘superordinate’ agents working at the level of iconic
representations to activate sets of subagents, this being the key to a system of emotions.
Intuition implies possession of ways to transform iconic to symbolic representations that apply
affective tags to the symbolic representations (somatic markers). The conscious feeling of
emotions is closely associated with the ability of an agent to monitor its own body states, which
is valuable not only from a standpoint of individual survival but also because it is a prerequisite
for the ability of an agent to articulate its emotional state, which in turn facilitates social learning.
Finally, the incorporation of a suitably broad system of emotions into agent design provides the
means for the entrenchment of moral sentiments, ensuring fitness for participating in
communities.
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As we improve our understanding of what the design of emancipated agents would require,
human intuition becomes less mysterious. We may therefore reject Penrose’s final claim also.
If ordinary biology in the form of the somatic marker hypothesis can account for intuition, then
it is clearly unnecessary to call upon quantum mechanics for the purpose. Schrödinger’s cat
need not be let into the Chinese room.
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